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Review
Imitation as an inheritance system
Nicholas Shea*
Faculty of Philosophy and Somerville College, University of Oxford, Philosophy Centre,
10 Merton Street, Oxford OX1 4JJ, UK
What is the evolutionary significance of the various mechanisms of imitation, emulation and social
learning found in humans and other animals? This paper presents an advance in the theoretical
resources for addressing that question, in the light of which standard approaches from the cultural
evolution literature should be refocused. The central question is whether humans have an imitation-
based inheritance system—a mechanism that has the evolutionary function of transmitting
behavioural phenotypes reliably down the generations. To have the evolutionary power of an inheri-
tance system, an imitiation-based mechanism must meet a range of demanding requirements.
The paper goes on to review the evidence for and against the hypothesis that there is indeed an
imitation-based inheritance system in humans.
Keywords: mechanisms of imitation; evolution of imitation; inheritance system;
mirror system; cultural evolution
1. INTRODUCTION
What explains the extraordinary richness of human
societies? Our culture is much richer than in other
species: more artefacts, technological innovation,
bodies of knowledge and complex social organization.
Doubtless, special psychological mechanisms are part
of the story. For a long time, the capacity to imitate
has been given centre stage. Perhaps the richness of
human culture is due to an innate and uniquely
human imitative ability? It is all very well to hypothesize
that a more developed capacity for imitation would give
rise to greater cultural complexity. But the empirical
picture is by no means so clear. Recent investigations
of the mechanisms and functions of imitation, many
of which are reported and summarized in this theme
issue, put that simple story seriously in doubt.
Although it has been known for a long time that
many species are capable of forms of social learning,
it is now becoming clear that some do so in surpris-
ingly intelligent ways. One strand of developmental
work in humans also brings out the rationality of
infant and child imitation. The extent to which
children imitate at all depends upon being in an appro-
priate social or ‘natural pedagogical’ context.
Furthermore, in being selective about which actions
they tend to imitate, children appear to show an
appreciation of the intentional nature of a model’s
action and the causal structure of the problem to
which it is applied. A second strand seems to pull in
the opposite direction, emphasizing the extent to
which humans engage in ‘blind’ imitation, copying
even irrelevant actions in a way that other species do
not. Further results reported here cast doubt on the
idea that there is an innate or developmentally cana-
lized mechanism of imitation, the mirror system,
endowed with a fixed library of mappings from
observed actions to bodily movements. So empirical
investigation has undermined the satisfyingly simple
hypothesis that the ability to imitate is innate, if signifi-
cant elements depend upon individual learning, and
uniquely human, if other species can imitate bodily
movements of conspecifics and do so in rational
ways; although elements of the unfolding picture
suggest that the way humans imitate does have
peculiar features. The evidence could be divided into
elements that support and undermine the simple
hypothesis, but that would miss the extent to which
the data generate new questions of their own. Why is
human imitation intelligent in some ways and obtuse
in others? Given that other species also have cumulat-
ive cultures that appear to be based on forms of social
learning, why are their behavioural traditions so much
more limited than those found in humans? This ques-
tion is especially puzzling in the light of other species’
abilities to imitate in rational ways, and the fact that
humans seem sometimes to be less rational imitators.
And what are the mechanisms involved in human
imitation, if the capacity to imitate is not based on
being endowed with a mirror system that develops
independently of any learning?
When empirical results appear to pull in different
directions and puzzles abound, a different theoretical
framework is called for. One could think of social
learning as being a species of individual learning,
where the source of information happens to be the
behaviour of conspecifics (in the same way as the
behaviour of other species can carry useful infor-
mation: we can learn that the song of the cuckoo is a
sign of the arrival of spring). Just as features of the
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animate and inanimate environment can act as cues to
features of the world that are relevant to an individual,
so can features of conspecifics, including where and
how aspects of their behaviour are performed. A
quite different approach sees social learning as an
inheritance system: a mechanism whose purpose is to
pass phenotypic traits down the generations. From
this perspective, the behaviour of conspecifics is not
just another source of information on which individual
learning can rely. This kind of individual learning
from others is sufficient on its own to give rise to
cumulative cultures, but it is unlikely to be evolutiona-
rily powerful. A mechanism that has the function of
passing phenotypic traits down the generations will
have additional features, adapted to their role in con-
veying information across multiple generations,
features that appear paradoxical if we see social cues
merely as an extra source of input for individual
learning.
This paper argues that the empirical results can be
usefully integrated around this question: does some
type of imitation form an inheritance system? Several
aspects of the unfolding empirical picture would fit
together nicely if humans have an imitation-based
inheritance system: the selectivity to copy only inten-
tional actions and the disposition blindly to imitate
seemingly irrelevant intentional actions; the tendency to
imitate in ‘pedagogical’ contexts; and the finding that
the ‘mirror system’may not be innate or developmentally
canalized. A distinctively human imitation-based
inheritance system would also dissolve our central
puzzle: why the cumulative cultures found in other
species are so limited despite the rationality of some
of the mechanisms involved. I will argue in the next
section that features that are beneficial from the
point of view of individual learning—like only copying
those aspects of the model’s behaviour that are
causally necessary to achieve some useful goal—may
be maladaptive if the function is stably to transmit
behavioural phenotypes down the generations, since
they act as noise in the transmission system.
There are many other suggestions for explaining the
uniqueness of human culture: language, powerful
general intelligence, social emotions, cultural group
selection and so on. I am not offering the imitation-
based inheritance system as a magic bullet that explains
everything that is special about human cognition and
social organization. Instead, the hypothesis I want
to assess is whether an imitation-based mechanism
is one of the many things that make humans different.
If we find that only humans have an inheritance-based
imitation system, that would explain the comparatively
limited cumulative cultures found in other species, and
thereby form part of an answer to the broader question
about human exceptionalism.
It is by no means clear that humans do in fact have
an imitation-based inheritance system. Recent devel-
opments make that a hypothesis worthy of serious
consideration, but there is evidence that counts both
ways. Section 3 below offers a survey of the evidence,
in particular, of the results discussed in this volume.
My purpose here is not to defend the claim that
humans do have an imitation-based inheritance
system. On that the jury is still out. Rather, I aim to
show it to be a useful hypothesis for assessing the sig-
nificance of several empirical results. The general idea
is not wholly original, of course, but I will argue that it
should be understood in a particular way. So in the
next section I spell out in more detail what it would
take for imitation to be evolutionarily powerful
enough to qualify as an inheritance system.
2. EVOLUTIONARILY POWERFUL IMITATION
(a) Evolvability conditions
A Darwinian process of some kind will occur whenever
certain very general conditions are satisfied. If individ-
uals vary in their characteristics in a way that causes
differential reproduction and is heritable, the popu-
lation will evolve by natural selection (Lewontin
1970; Godfrey-Smith 2007). Satisfying those general
conditions is a necessary, but not a sufficient,
condition for the evolution of adaptive complexity.
Different mechanisms that pass the threshold of
giving rise to natural selection differ in their capacity
to produce complex adaptations and to sustain a
large variety of adaptations. Some evolutionary
mechanisms are more ‘evolvable’ than others (Sterelny
2001, 2004). Here, I will focus on three sorts of con-
ditions that are widely accepted to make a Darwinian
process more evolutionarily powerful.
First, high copying fidelity: a mechanism that makes
the phenotypes on which selection acts strongly
heritable will be more evolvable. Copying fidelity is
important if adaptations, once selected for, are to be
preserved. Of course, a small rate of copying errors
can play an important role in generating variation on
which natural selection acts; and even with a higher
error rate a broadly Darwinian process may occur,
but the accumulation of adaptive phenotypes depends
on phenotypes, once selected for, being faithfully
copied down the generations. Of course, this requires
that any copy errors also be faithfully reproduced
down the generations. Only then is cumulative selec-
tion possible. Otherwise, adaptations that have been
selected can be lost too readily through copying errors.
Second are anti-outlaw conditions, which act to
prevent phenotypic variants replicating themselves in
ways that do not benefit the individuals which have
them. An organism flourishes through the complex
interdependence of many different phenotypes. Some
of these could promote their own replication in ways
that damage the organism that has them. When a
somatic cell mutates and reproduces without limit,
that leads to an increase in the number of cells of
that new type (typically in a cancerous tumour), to
the cost of the individual organism. The evolution of
multi-cellular organisms depended on damping down
the tendency for individual cell lines to attempt to go
it alone (Maynard Smith & Szathmary 1995).
Cancer cells miss out on having long-run descendants
because they do not reach the next generation—their
effect is limited to the soma. So the existence of a
single-celled stage in the life cycle helps to guard
against such outlaws, making possible the evolution
of multi-cellularity. If behavioural phenotypes can
make use of imitation mechanisms to spread as
memes, in ways that do not benefit individual
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organisms, then that serves to undermine the capacity
of the imitation mechanism to form the basis of indi-
vidual-level selection of adaptive traits. Imitation
mechanisms will have greater evolutionary power if
they include means of guarding against outlaws—
features akin to the single-celled stage that is part of
the life cycle of many multi-cellular organisms. Par-
ticularly important in this context are mechanisms
that encourage vertical transmission of traits from
parents to offspring. An item that can readily spread
horizontally or obliquely can increase its relative fre-
quency relatively independently of the effect it has on
the individual reproductive fitness of the individuals
to which it spreads. Such traits can spread like harmful
viruses, according to an analogy that is familiar from
the literature on memes. Mechanisms that favour ver-
tical transmission from parents to offspring act to bring
the fate of the replicating item into line with the
reproductive fitness of the individual organism. So an
imitation mechanism will, other things being equal, be
more evolutionarily powerful if it has features encoura-
ging vertical transmission of behavioural traits down the
generations and discouraging horizontal transmission.
The third set of evolvability conditions concerns
the ability of an inheritance mechanism to transmit a
wide range of novel variants. Novel variants may be
produced by errors in the copying process, but how
wide is the field of possibilities opened up thereby?
How wide is the space of behavioural phenotypes
that could be copied by imitation? Is variation limited
to some pre-existing set of behavioural programs that
the organism is capable of performing without learn-
ing; or perhaps to recombinations of elements from
that set? The mechanisms of imitation will be more
evolutionarily powerful if they have access to a very
wide range of possible behavioural phenotypes. The
broader the range of selectable variation, the easier it
will be to build up adaptive complexity in a series of
small, gradual steps. Indeed, Maynard Smith &
Szathmary (1995) argue that the appearance of unlim-
ited systems of replication was a crucial transition in
evolution. So it is important to know whether there
are limits on the range of behavioural phenotypes
that can be passed on by imitation, and whether that
range varies between different species.
These evolvability conditions are representative, not
exhaustive; but together they form a revealing lens
through which to examine the empirical data on imita-
tion. An imitation mechanism with these features
would be more evolutionarily powerful, and hence
more likely to give rise to complex cumulative culture,
than the one that just satisfies the bare necessary con-
ditions on evolution by natural selection. Accordingly,
if humans have an imitation mechanism with these
features and other animals do not, we would have
the bare bones of an explanation of why humans
have more complex cumulative culture than found in
other species.
(b) Focus on individual-level selection
The focus here will be on the potential of imitation to
be a driver of selection at the level of individual organ-
isms, with patterns of behaviour being among the
many phenotypic features of individuals that pass
vertically down the generations and affect the repro-
ductive fitness of those individuals. There may be
other Darwinian processes going on as well. Boyd &
Richerson have argued that social learning heuristics
like conformity bias act as constraints on the horizon-
tal transmission of cultural variants so as to allow a
form of cultural group selection for beneficial behav-
ioural traits (Boyd & Richerson 1985). When taking
this perspective, the entities over which the Darwinian
process occurs are social groups themselves, which
reproduce by giving rise to further social groups
resembling the parent group in various behavioural
or cultural respects. From the perspective of individ-
ual-level selection, the costs are high when useful
information is shared horizontally, with non-relatives,
because selection occurs on the basis of fitness
differences between individuals, irrespective of
changes in absolute fitness. In Boyd & Richerson’s
model, those individual-level costs are offset by
benefits to the group of sharing the useful behavioural
phenotypes.
The papers in this volume that focus on culture
(Tennie et al. 2009; Whiten et al. 2009) are interested
in imitation as a driver of selection at the level of indi-
vidual organisms. Here the fitness costs of sharing
useful information are reduced by one of the evolvabil-
ity conditions identified above: a restriction to vertical
transmission. Although in many modern societies
imitation may primarily act between unrelated individ-
uals, in the recent evolutionary past, when people lived
in much smaller kin-based groups, it is plausible that
imitation operated mostly between older kin and
younger kin. Such ‘extended vertical cultural trans-
mission’ (Mameli 2008) reduces the fitness cost of
sharing useful information. Combined with other fac-
tors to facilitate evolvability, extended vertical cultural
transmission has the capability to make behavioural
traits acquired by imitation the basis of individual-
level cumulative selection. By contrast, in Boyd &
Richerson’s models of cultural group selection, confor-
mity bias and success bias play the role of ensuring the
retention of adaptive cultural variants, but they count
against novel variants (which necessarily start at low fre-
quency) being faithfully copied down the generations so
as to form the basis of selection. There is no scope here
to assess the importance of cultural group selection, but
it is sufficient to observe that imitation is plausibly the
basis of individual-level selection for behavioural phe-
notypes, which is at least compatible with the existence
of Darwinian processes at the level of cultural groups,
and may be more important in the cumulative selection
of adaptive behavioural phenotypes.
Others see merit in ascribing fitness values to behav-
ioural traits themselves—as memes—so as to analyse
their spread in a population in a Darwinian way
(Dawkins 1976; Blackmore 1999). As we have just
seen, from the perspective of individual-level selection,
memes are outlaws that can undermine the accumu-
lation of adaptive complexity. While imitation does
have the potential to be an evolutionarily powerful pro-
cess when it operates at the level of individual selection,
it is much more controversial that the spread of memes
could drive the evolution by natural selection of
complex adaptations. So my focus here is not on those
Review. Imitation as an inheritance system N. Shea 2431
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phenomena, but on imitation as a way of transmitting
behavioural traits vertically between kin, as a potential
supplement to other channels of genetic and epigenetic
inheritance. If it turns out that imitation is not evolutio-
narily powerful at the level of individual selection, it
remains open that it has an important role based on
cultural group selection. Conversely, if there is good
reason to think that imitation is evolutionarily powerful
through vertical transmission and individual-level
selection, there is less need to find a group-selectionist
explanation for the same phenomena, although it
remains possible that further group-based evolutionary
processes occur in parallel.
(c) Qualifying as an inheritance system
Scientific studies may indeed find that there is an
imitation mechanism, perhaps unique to humans,
that satisfies the evolvability conditions listed earlier
(at least to some extent), and that thereby forms the
basis for the cumulative selection of behavioural phe-
notypes. The question would then arise: why does
the imitation mechanism have those neat features?
One answer is that it is merely fortuitous: imitation
happens to be embedded in the context of mechanisms
that in fact operate to increase evolvability, but that
occurred by chance. Another is that there was selection
for these features, precisely because they do underpin
evolvability. If these features were indeed selected,
then their selective function is to give rise to heritable
behavioural phenotypes. This is an additional func-
tion, over and above the particular behavioural
functions of any of the phenotypes that are transmitted
by this route. Compare DNA: it also has evolutionary
functions of two kinds (Godfrey-Smith 1999). When a
gene has been selected because of the fitness advantage
conferred by the phenotype it produces, then that gene
will thereby have an evolutionary function—to pro-
duce that phenotype. But the whole system of DNA,
transcription, translation and so on has a further
function of its own, a meta-function: to transmit phe-
notypes stably down the generations (on which natural
selection will then act). Such a meta-function can
only have arisen as a result of a series of selective
events of the former, first-order kind. Natural selection
relies on the existence of heritable variation, but selec-
tion for adaptations in the transmission mechanism as
a whole can only take place over the course of a series
of episodes of first-order selection.1 It is reasonably
clear that DNA does indeed have this meta-function.
That can be inferred from the existence of mechanisms
of DNA proofreading and repair and their importance
in germ line as well as somatic cell inheritance.
For an imitation mechanism to have this meta-
function is for it, too, to have the evolutionary function
reliably to transmit behavioural phenotypes, a function
that we can infer from detailed knowledge of how the
mechanism operates. There is still considerable dis-
agreement about whether and how traits that support
evolvability could themselves have evolved (Maynard
Smith & Szathmary 1995; Schlosser & Wagner 2004;
Sterelny in press). Lineage-based selection may have
been important, although individual-level selection
may be sufficient on its own.2 It is reasonably clear
that DNA has evolved by some process to have this
kind of meta-function. The question here is whether
there is some imitation mechanism that has it as
well. I reserve the term ‘inheritance system’ for a
mechanism with the meta-function of passing pheno-
typic traits down the generations.
So we can discern three increasingly strong claims
that can be made about the evolutionary properties
of an imitation mechanism. First is the claim that the
imitation mechanism gives rise to a Darwinian
process—by meeting the bare necessary conditions
for evolution by natural selection. Second, that it
founds the cumulative selection of behavioural
phenotypes—by meeting the various conditions on
evolvability discussed earlier, at least to some extent.
The third and strongest claim is that there is an imita-
tion mechanism that has the meta-function of giving
rise to heritable behavioural phenotypes—i.e. which
is an inheritance system. In the case of DNA, we
inferred that it has a similar meta-function on the
basis of the presence of various features of the mechan-
ism that make best sense as being there for reasons of
evolvability. The same logic can be applied to imita-
tion, although here things are more complex. If
empirical studies do indeed show that some form of
imitation mechanism operates in ways that meet the
evolvability conditions (at least in humans), for example
by increasing the fidelity with which behaviours
(including novel variants) are copied, or by encoura-
ging vertical transmission between kin, then it is very
plausible to infer that such features have been selected
to play that evolutionary role. It would follow that,
just like DNA, the imitation mechanism does indeed
have the meta-function of giving rise to heritable
phenotypes.3
If there is a type of imitation that is an adaptation
for transmitting behavioural phenotypes down the
generations, then it certainly will not be an entirely
novel mechanism. It will make use of preexisting
psychological resources, many shared with other
animals, and perhaps others that have evolved in
humans for other reasons. Compare the evolution of
the human vocal tract, for example, which involved
the re-arrangement of structural features, such as the
tongue, epiglottis and larynx, for which there were
pre-existing developmental programmes with their
own functions, as well as the addition of novel features,
so that the new complex could perform novel functions
(Crelin 1987). The meta-function question asks
whether, in the same way, there is a complex of traits
that together amount to a mechanism of imitation
with the evolutionary function of giving rise to herita-
ble behavioural phenotypes. Such a mechanism will
probably co-opt psychological capacities present for
other reasons but add features so as to perform the
inheritance function.
(d) Fidelity of transmission
Having motivated an interest in evolvability con-
ditions, the next two sections show how they play out
in the particular case of imitation mechanisms. The
first set of evolvability conditions concern stability of
transmission. Some level of heritability of phenotypes
is a necessary condition for evolution by natural selec-
tion, but high-fidelity transmission is more
2432 N. Shea Review. Imitation as an inheritance system
Phil. Trans. R. Soc. B (2009)
 on 31 July 2009rstb.royalsocietypublishing.orgDownloaded from 
evolutionarily powerful. Selection leads trait frequen-
cies in a population to carry useful information
about the selective forces in which that population is
found. Transmission errors degrade that information.
So if there is an imitation-based inheritance system,
we should expect it to have features designed to
ensure that behavioural phenotypes, including novel
variants, are faithfully copied down the generations.
There is clearly a balance to be struck because,
although the generation of novel variants will consti-
tute noise in the transmission system, the generation
of some novel variants is a necessary condition on
there being cumulative selection at all. In the context
of an inherently noisy system like imitation learning,
achieving high-fidelity copying will be a more relevant
constraint than ensuring that there is some noise in the
copying mechanism. If there is to be cumulative selec-
tion, novel variants too must be copied—Tomasello’s
(1999) ratchet effect—but if individuals were regularly
to vary their behaviour so that the behavioural traits
they pass on to be imitated differ from those they
learnt by imitation, then the copying mechanism
would be too low-fidelity to allow adaptations to
accumulate. Any increase in the frequency of a trait
owing to selection would be more than offset by copy-
ing errors that reduce the frequency of that trait in
subsequent generations. So modifications to an
imitated behaviour introduced by an individual,
either accidentally or intentionally, even if made for
good reason, will reduce the fidelity of the imitation-
based inheritance system and hence, other things
being equal, reduce its evolutionary power.
As well as modifications to learnt behaviour, a
further source of noise is accidental bodily movements.
These are around to be observed, even though the
potential model is neither producing them because of
having learnt them by imitation, nor because they
intend them for other reasons. Imitation of accidental
bodily movements would be reduced, and hence
copying fidelity increased, by a bias towards copying
only intentionally produced bodily movements,
mitigating the possibility of a behavioural pattern pro-
duced by accident being copied down the generations.
This could be achieved without presupposing an abil-
ity to infer the mental states of others. One way is if
accidental bodily movements have distinctive percep-
tual features that distinguish them from intentionally
produced actions, at least roughly. For example, an
intentional action may have smoother movement con-
tours, and may slow and become more fine grained as
the limb or tool nears its objective. The fact that
intentional actions follow trajectories that correct for
perturbations, whereas accidental bodily movements
are deflected by external causes, may be a further per-
ceptible clue. Goals that are emulated need not be
understood as mental states, either. For these
purposes, a goal is just some state of the world that a
learner can observe, either an end state (e.g. getting
termites out of the ground) or an intermediate state
(e.g. getting a short thick stick). Such goals can be
copied without the learner having any thoughts
about the mental states of the model. The same pro-
blem arises. How is the observer to distinguish changes
in the model’s environment that are produced
intentionally (goals) from accidental effects on the
environment? A rough and ready perceptually based
bias may be less readily available with respect to
goals/outcomes. One alternative possibility is that the
imitator only copies outcomes they have seen achieved
multiple times, which would count against accidental
outcomes to the extent that they occur less often than
intended consequences (so there are fewer instances
available to be observed),4 although that would not
stop commonly occurring accidental side effects being
picked up and transmitted.
Another way that the fidelity of the copying process
may be lowered is by individuals thinking for them-
selves. Individuals may be able to infer a more efficient
way of bringing about the goal of some observed
action. Or they may be able to discover a more efficient
solution by trial and error learning. It seems as if such
modifications can only increase the potential of an imi-
tation mechanisms to give rise to cumulative adaption
by allowing individuals to improve the adaptiveness of
the behaviours they pass on. However, suppose the
models have used a novel means for a good reason,
but one that is transient: the models might act with
their foot because their hands are occupied. Those
kinds of individual innovations, although individually
rational, from the point of view of an inheritance
system would constitute noise in the process of trans-
mission. Once animals have the capacity to tell for
themselves what the most efficient ways of achieving
a goal are, they may well be able to make distinctions
among intentionally produced behaviours. Where
they see an inefficient means to an end that the
model has a good reason to adopt (e.g. because their
hands are occupied), the means are unlikely to have
been copied down the generations, and so only the
goals of the action sequence should be emulated.
However, when a model performs an action in a way
that seems inefficient and is not due to some other
constraint, the observer could have one of the two dis-
positions. The rational reaction from the point of view
of individual learning would be not to copy the ineffi-
cient behaviour, but instead to perform an action that
achieves the same goal more efficiently. However,
the better disposition from the point of view of an
inheritance system would be to copy the inefficient
behavioural program—its very inefficiency suggests
that it is only being produced because it has been
copied down the generations. Of course, the model
will not appreciate these reasons for having one dispo-
sition rather than another. These are the ‘free floating’
reasons of evolution rather than the explicitly rep-
resented reasons of rationality (Dennett 1995). But if
we find an imitation mechanism that has the latter
disposition, its apparently paradoxical nature would
be explained if it is part of an inheritance system.
Accordingly, even if we find a disposition to copy
irrelevant bodily movements in some contexts, we
cannot conclude that the imitation always involves
slavish copying, because it may be part of a more
sophisticated disposition: to copy goals and bodily
movements, to ignore bodily movements where the
model has a peculiar reason for achieving the goal in
an inefficient way, but still to copy bodily movements
where there is no obvious reason for performing in
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an inefficient way. That is not blind imitation, butwould
demonstrate a sophisticated (albeit implicit) grasp of
the intentional structure of the actions being copied.
An analogous case is the experience of following the
protocol for some complex experiment (although
contrasting in being a case where the purposes are all
explicitly represented and considered). Scientists gen-
erally copy all the details of a protocol. There may be
no good reason for using 10 ml rather than 20 or 5 ml
of some solvent, say. This may just be the way it was
first done, and since it worked no one has bothered
to find out if the quantity could be varied. Indeed,
some experiments are so tricky to get right that prac-
titioners show an almost religious adherence to the
letter of a known protocol. When an experiment
takes hours or days to perform, there is very little
motivation to put the result at risk in order to identify
which steps or quantities are essential and which can
be varied. So all sorts of techniques and steps are
copied without any appreciation of whether or why
they are necessary to achieve the goal—following an
experimental protocol can feel rather like following a
magic spell. But if some new piece of apparatus or
technique comes out that represents a shortcut, exper-
imenters will probably try it out. In such cases, the
scientist can appreciate a reason why the recipe was
previously performed in an inefficient way—because
of a technological limitation—which reason has now
changed. This is a rather sophisticated kind of selective
copying, and even so it involves copying some features
without any appreciation of the reasons for them.
Huber et al. (2009) suggest a theoretical framework
in which imitation is classified in terms of whether a
movement, action or result is copied. This takes off
from Tomasello’s (1990) influential distinction
between emulation and true imitation, based on the
observation that chimpanzees will learn from obser-
vation that some new result can be achieved, and
copy it, but tend not to reproduce the means that
the model deployed to achieve that result. This is not
the same as the distinction between goals and means
to achieve them, since changes in the world can also
be means to achieve a goal and, at least in humans,
performing a bodily movement can be a goal in
itself. Rather, there is a continuum from the detailed
motor programs deployed, assembled into a complex
action sequence, through more coarse-grained
descriptions of the same sequence as types of actions
(e.g. reaching out to grasp an object), to the proximal
and distal environmental results achieved. It is
undoubtedly important to know where on this conti-
nuum a particular putatively imitated behaviour is
located. But for our purposes, a different way of divid-
ing up the cases may be more important, namely how
these actions are related to rewards. A seeming differ-
ence between copying bodily movements or merely
copying worldly results may, in fact, reflect a difference
in levels of reward-driven motivation. Even if an
animal is capable of copying bodily movements, it
will not manifest that ability if it is strongly motivated
to obtain available rewards as quickly as possible by the
most efficient means available. So while a difference in
how much is imitated on the continuum between
detailed motor programs and distal environmental
results may be explained by a difference in the capacity
to imitate bodily movements, it may also reflect a
difference in the motivation to imitate bodily move-
ments or in the relative strength of the motivation to
obtain available rewards. A species under strong moti-
vational pressure to obtain available rewards quickly
and efficiently would be unlikely to manifest the ability
to imitate detailed bodily movements, even were they
to possess it. So a difference that has standardly been
seen as a matter of ability (lacking the ability to imitate
actions or detailed bodily movements) might instead
be the result of a difference in motivation. The evol-
utionary result is the same either way: emulation
rather than strict imitation. Conversely, a species that
is inclined to imitate irrespective of whether immediate
rewards are achieved is more likely to imitate bodily
movements as well as emulate rewarding goals.
At this point, a familiar debate in the imitation
literature arises. Surely, the objection runs, imitated
behaviours must be good for individuals if they are to
be selected? So the ability of an observer toweed out inef-
ficient behaviours must be a good thing. Indeed, would
not a disposition to copy irrelevant behaviours under-
mine the utility of imitation, by causing the proliferation
of all kinds of useless and costly behaviours? This debate
is a great example of a theoretical tangle that can be nicely
resolved by adopting the inheritance system framework.
The feature that looks good from the point of view of
individual learning and leads to good outcomes in an
individual lifetime—adopting the most efficient means
to an end—represents damaging noise in a behavioural
inheritance system. The optimal balance between the
two dispositions depends upon the type of information
individuals come across and how reliable it is.
Learning rates in individual learning offer a useful
analogy. Just how heavily should a learner weigh a new
piece of information? Suppose an agent is learning
about probabilistic response–outcome contingencies
in a stochastic environment in which those probabilities
can change. In a stable environment where the prob-
abilities linking responses with outcomes do not
change much over time, an unexpected outcome, for
example, a response that does not produce an expected
reward, should not weigh very heavily. It is likely to be
just noise, so the learner should not adjust its view of
the response–outcome contingency very much. But in
a volatile environment, the same unexpected outcome
carries much more information because it may well
indicate that the response–outcome contingencies have
changed. So the learner should adjust its view of the
response–outcome contingency much more (Behrens
et al. 2007). In the stable environment, learning
quickly from an unexpected outcome is maladaptive,
reducing long-term payoffs. Taking the analogy across
to inherited behaviours, they are well suited to carry
information about long-run contingencies between
behaviours and payoffs. Allowing individuals to learn
quickly in response to local conditions may reduce
those long-run payoffs. The imitation-based inheri-
tance system can accumulate information about how
behaviours tend to produce benefit in the environments
in which they are performed down the generations. Indi-
vidual learning would, in some circumstances, degrade
the quality of that information.
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When should we expect individual learning to be
less adaptive, in the long run, than relying on inherited
information? One case is when the outcomes are too
stochastic for the sample encountered by individuals
to have much reliability. Sterelny offers the example
of a subsistence farmer deciding which cereal to
plant (Henrich 2002; Sterelny 2006). When individ-
uals plant a particular crop, the contingency between
their choice and the eventual yield is highly statistically
variable. Even when they pick the best crop for the
most likely climatic conditions, there is so much
variation in annual weather patterns that it will by no
means always lead to a good crop; nor will badly
chosen varieties always lead to poor yields. So the
information available to individuals is just too impo-
verished to allow them on their own to build up
much knowledge about likely crop yields. Sterelny fol-
lows Henrich in arguing that a tendency just to follow
local customs arises to address this problem. If some
folk agricultural practice has been inherited vertically
down the generations, then its very persistence is a
sign of its relative efficacy. An individual tendency to
do what seemed to have the best outcome in individual
experience would swamp this historical signal, and so
prevent the accumulation of a useful body of folk agri-
cultural practices. Food preparation taboos may be
similar. Another case arises when the outcomes
occur on a timescale that is of little use for individual
learners. The connection between smoking and
cancer is like that. The contingency is quite strong,
but cancer takes so long to arise that it is hard to
detect the contingency. Surprising as it seems, it took
all the power of modern medical statistics to discover
the sad contingency that we now think is easy to
observe in the lifetime of individual smokers.
In other circumstances, individual learning may be
superior to a disposition to copy behavioural programs
without assessing their efficacy in producing beneficial
outcomes. Which disposition is normatively superior
will depend on the structure of the problem space.
When the information available to individual learners is
highly statistically variable, or feedback takes too long
to be usefully processed, then a disposition to block indi-
vidual learning may be adaptive, in order to preserve the
signal of information built up over the generations. Itmay
be that there is a greater disposition to learn by imitation
in somedomains rather than others, in away that roughly
tracks the variability in these trade-offs. If not, the relative
cost of error assumes pressing importance. Maybe imita-
tion would be a great way to pass on some skills that are
beneficial in the long run in a way that is undetectable
in the life of a single individual, but if an effect of
having this imitative tendency is to block individual learn-
ing about important outcomes which the individual
would be capable of learning about, then the relative fit-
ness costs and benefits would favour individual learning
over long-run imitation. The trade off depends upon
the empirical details of individuals’ capacities and their
ecological niche.
(e) Other evolvability conditions
So much for stability conditions and high-fidelity
transmission. The other two types of condition we
will focus on involve less revision of theoretical
perspective, and so can be dealt with more briefly.
The second class of evolvability conditions are the
anti-outlaw conditions, in particular, a tendency for
transmission to occur vertically from parents to off-
spring. Vertical transmission helps guard against the
proliferation of variants that replicate themselves at
the expense of the long-run fitness of the individuals
which bear them. As we have seen, verticality is not
restricted to the parent–offspring relationship, but
also includes transmission to more distant genetic
relatives. So the question is whether there is a type of
imitation that is constrained to encourage extended ver-
tical transmission between kin (in the kinds of popu-
lation structures in which it evolved). We can also ask
whether there is any anti-outlaw mechanism equivalent
to the bottleneck represented by the single-cell stage in
the life cycle of multicellular organisms.
The third class of evolvability conditions includes
the ability to transmit a wide variety of novel variants.
The simple old picture held that imitation was an
innate ability served by a special-purpose mechanism,
more recently identified with the mirror system. To
copy observed behaviours, an imitator must somehow
map perceptual inputs onto their own motor actions—
the correspondence problem. An innate mirror system
is postulated to ‘solve’ the correspondence problem by
suggesting that a fixed library of mappings from per-
ceptual input to motor output is developmentally
canalized in each of us, maturing in a way that does
not depend upon variable inputs from the environ-
ment (that being one sense of what it is to be
innate). (Of course, that only ‘solves’ the correspon-
dence problem by pushing back the explanandum to
the question of how we come to have such a develop-
mental capacity.) However, if individuals come to imi-
tative learning with a fixed solution to the
correspondence problem—a developmentally cana-
lized library of motor programs that they can recognize
from perceptual input—then the scope for an imitation
system to transmit a wide range of novel variants is
seriously curtailed. Recombining thesemotor programs
into arbitrary sequences may produce a range of novel
patterns of behaviour to be inherited, but the range
will be nowhere near as wide as if entirely new motor
programs and motor-perceptual associations could be
acquired. In principle, an imitation-based inheritance
system could lie at many places on this continuum
while still being evolutionarily powerful, but the greater
the range of potential novel variants that could be
passed on, the greater will be the capacity of the
system to accumulate adaptive behavioural phenotypes
(and hence the greater the importance to be attached to
imitation as an explanation of the behavioural complex-
ity of human culture). Although there is strong evidence
that humans, at least, have a capacity to imitate various
behaviours that is innate in the foregoing sense, more
recent results raise the serious possibility that general-
purpose learning mechanisms have a role to play,
either in addition to or instead of a fixed innate library
of imitable motor programs.
If individuals do indeed learn perceptuo-motor
mappings from individual experience, how does that
square with the points about imitation-based
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inheritance being insulated from individual learning
that we discussed a moment ago? The answer is to
distinguish between solving the correspondence
problem, on the one hand, and acquiring behavioural
programs to be deployed in given contexts, on the
other. Individuals’ tacit knowledge of which of their
own motor programs correspond to various observed
behaviours may depend on their own experience, but
that does not determine which behaviours they will
perform in which contexts; nor does it determine
which goals they will pursue. To emulate goals and
copy programs of behaviour in the pursuit of those
outcomes does depend on having a solution to the
correspondence problem, but involves much more:
chaining together action sequences and deploying
them in a context-dependent way in the pursuit of rel-
evant goals. I have tacit knowledge that would allow
me to imitate an observed Nazi salute, but I do not
have the disposition to perform that action in any con-
text at all. Individual experience may be important in
expanding the range of bodily movements that are
available as novel variants that could be passed on by
imitation. To be passed on by imitation, individuals
must not only learn from experience how to execute
such novel motor programs, and learn their perceptual
correspondences, they must also learn by imitation in
which context to perform that action. The learnt motor
program must be coupled with a disposition to perform
that action in some circumstances if the behaviour is to
be repeated and then copied down the generations. It is
that complex whose function plausibly depends upon
selection down generations of individuals. Therefore, if
it turns out that the correspondence problem, or some
aspect of it, is solved through individual learning, then
that in no way counts against there being an imitation-
based inheritance system. It may even count in favour
of an inheritance function, by allowing for the trans-
mission of novel variants. When it was discovered that
macaques, and possibly humans, have a mirror system,
the old story that viewed imitation as an innate special-
purpose ability was supplemented with the claim that
the mirror system is a canalized adaptation for solving
the correspondence problem. Thinking carefully about
evolvability causes us dramatically to change our per-
spective. A developmentally canalized mirror system
had been thought to bolster the claim that imitation
forms an inheritance system, but we now see that
an imitation-based inheritance system would be more
evolutionarily powerful if the mechanism for tackling
the correspondence problem is not developmentally
canalized, but instead learnt from individual experience,
because that would dramatically increase the range of
behavioural variants on which selection can act.
This section has motivated the hypothesis that
humans may have an imitation mechanism that
forms an inheritance system. The next section will
survey recent developments in the empirical literature.
Unsurprisingly, the picture that emerges is by no
means clear-cut. Some lines of evidence favour the
inheritance system hypothesis, others count against it.
The burden of the present paper is not to establish
that hypothesis, but rather to show how the inheritance
system framework can provide a useful perspective on
some otherwise puzzling emerging results.
3. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN THE EVIDENCE
(a) High-fidelity transmission
Human social learning is clearly different in many
ways from social learning in other animals, just as
there are many differences in social learning amongst
other species. While it is reasonably clear that other
species can learn by observation about new goals that
are worth pursuing and new affordances of objects
(emulation), it was thought that they would not imitate
the actions by which such goals are achieved (Tomasello
et al. 1993). To the extent that other animals did copy
bodily movements, that was an automatic effect that
did not depend on the action being relevant to achiev-
ing some goal. More recent results, discussed by
Huber et al., Tennie et al. and Whiten et al. in this
theme issue, suggest that other species are capable of
copying bodily movements, in a way that depends on
the action being a means for achieving a useful out-
come. For example, in a two-action paradigm in
which two groups of marmosets were selectively
exposed to one of two different methods for achieving
the very same result, marmosets tended to achieve
that result by performing the same action as the one
they had observed (Voelkl & Huber 2000). Voelkl &
Huber (2007) went on to do a detailed movement
analysis of marmoset behaviour, using a discriminant
analysis classifier, which suggested that observers pre-
cisely copied the movement patterns of the models
they had observed. Great apes can also be trained to
copy novel actions; from humans by learning the
general rule ‘do as I do’ and extending it to novel
actions; as, it seems, can dogs (both summarized by
Huber et al. 2009).
Dogs have been less thoroughly investigated than
great apes. Their abilities in experimental situations
be a result of domestic dogs having been selected for
their ability to interact socially with humans (Hare &
Tomasello 2005). Such results nevertheless offer a
hint that broadly imitative abilities may spread far
beyond the great apes, or even the primates. There is
evidence of goal-directed imitation in birds (Sagerson
et al. 2005), dolphins (Rendell & Whitehead 2001),
and even in fish. Archer fish (Toxotes chatareus) use a
precisely directed shot of water to knock flying insect
prey out of the air and into the water, where they are
eaten. The best technique for hitting moving prey
takes a while to learn by trial and error learning.
Subordinate fish do not themselves carry out any
trials in the presence of a dominant fish, but it seems
that observing the successful technique in the dominant
allows subordinates to perform it very rapidly when they
first have the chance to try it themselves (Schuster et al.
2006). This is goal-directed behaviour, rather than
automatic motor mimicry, in the sense that the fish
only perform the action in furtherance of the goal of
catching a passing flying insect.
Primates have a relatively sophisticated understand-
ing of the causal structure of actions and the goals to
which they are directed (Wood & Hauser 2008; cf.
Povinelli 2000). They deploy this understanding to
imitate selectively, not copying an inefficient means
to a desired goal (Buttelmann et al. 2007; Tennie
et al. 2009; Whiten et al. 2009). (This tendency has
contributed to the view that primates are at best
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emulators of observed goals.) For example, all four
species of great apes were able to learn by observation
that the door to a box could be opened, and would
then open it, but showed no tendency to do so in the
same way as demonstrated (pushing versus pulling;
Tennie et al. 2006). Similarly, primates can emulate
an observed goal using a novel means, other than the
one they have observed (Tennie et al. 2009). Dogs,
too, seem to imitate selectively to achieve the best
functional fit between actions and goal (Range et al.
2007; Huber et al. 2009). These are perfectly rational
tendencies, from the perspective of individual learn-
ing. But they act as serious limits on the power of
imitation as an inheritance system in such species.
Such individual modifications to the observed action
constitute noise in the transmission of behavioural
phenotypes down the generations. They block the
transmission of behaviours that do not seem to obser-
vers to be efficient means of achieving goals. This may
limit the range of behaviours that can be transmitted to
those that individuals are able to understand the causal
relevance of, which will not extend very far beyond the
range of behaviours individuals are capable of learning
for themselves (the ‘zone of latent solutions’; Tennie
et al. 2009). And if an individual does hit on an
improved way of reaching a goal that is non-obvious,
that information will be rapidly degraded in trans-
mission as individuals adopt what seem to them to
be more efficient ways of reaching the goal. These
tendencies, despite their undoubted advantages as
aids to individual-level learning, are likely to restrict
the extent to which imitation can form the basis of
cumulative selection. Similarly, primates are resistant
to learning a new strategy at all if they already have a strat-
egy that works (Tennie et al. 2009). This tendency too
will impair the transmission of behavioural phenotypes
down the generations.
In contrast with the rational selective imitation
seen in primates, human children sometimes demon-
strate surprisingly unselective ‘blind over-imitation’.
Meltzoff (1988) showed that 14-month-old infants
would imitate a seemingly inefficient bodily move-
ment, using the forehead to switch on an illuminated
lightbox one week after they had seen the same
action demonstrated. It has since been confirmed
that, at many ages, children are inclined to imitate a
method that is transparently inefficient, in contrast to
the more selective copying seen in other primates
(Tomasello 1999; Horner & Whiten 2005; Lyons
et al. 2007; McGuigan et al. 2007; Whiten et al.
2009). One result suggests that this blind over-
imitation may be more sensitive to rational
considerations than it first appears. Gergely et al.
(2002) repeated the Meltzoff paradigm—infants
watching a model turn on a light with her head—but
added a condition in which the model’s hands were
otherwise occupied. When the model had a good
reason to use her forehead to turn on the lightbox,
because her hands were occupied with holding a blan-
ket, 14-month olds were much less likely to imitate the
unusual head action. One interpretation is that
the infants were copying the unusual head action
in the ‘hands free’ condition precisely because it
seemed to them unnecessary (but see Jones 2009).
Given the relative facility shown by infants in under-
standing and even copying goals (Carpenter et al.
2005; Csibra 2008), the contrast between apes and
children demonstrated by Horner & Whiten (2005)
can seem particularly puzzling. Chimpanzees will imi-
tate a series of actions performed on an opaque box
before a reward is obtained, but will cut to the chase
when the same series is performed on a transparent
box. When the box is transparent, it is obvious that
some of the actions are unnecessary to reach the
goal. By contrast, children keep on performing the
unnecessary actions, even on the transparent box.
Lyons et al. (2007) suggest that children know the
steps are unnecessary, but imitate them anyway.
There is even some evidence that children follow a
developmental trajectory, starting off like chimpanzees
as more selective imitators, but increasing in their ten-
dency to imitate unnecessary actions as they grow from
3 to 5 years old (Whiten et al. 2009).
These results become much less puzzling in the
light of the hypothesis that human children have an
imitation-based inheritance system whereas other ani-
mals do not. The tendency to imitate unnecessary
actions will help to promote high-fidelity copying of
behavioural traits down the generations. Its presence
suggests an imitation-based mechanism with the
meta-function of ensuring high-fidelity copying.
The nascent developmental story, if vindicated in
further studies, would be a nice confirmation,
suggesting that the capacity for ‘over-imitation’ devel-
ops after, and is a kind of add-on to, a more ancient
and widely shared capacity to copy the actions
needed to achieve a goal.
This hypothesis also throws light on why other
species should primarily be emulators, even if they
have the capacity to imitate the means or bodily
movements used by a model to achieve a desired
end. If imitation is not adapted in other species to
the meta-function of faithfully copying behavioural
phenotypes, then this capacity will usually be masked
by the drive towards achieving the rewarding outcome
directly, by the most obvious method.
Other features of human imitation are more equiv-
ocal in respect of the imitation system hypothesis.
There is evidence that children will only imitate
action sequences that are successful (Want & Harris
2001; Harris & Want 2005), perhaps also when they
understand the intended goal of a model who tries
and fails (Tomasello & Carpenter 2005). This looks
like the kind of individual learning that would interfere
with high-fidelity transmission, although it could be
that achieving a goal, or understanding what the goal
is, acts as a basic input rule, highlighting sequences
of actions that are candidates for copying and
distinguishing them from accidents and other bodily
movements that are not. Indeed, we remarked above
that a capacity to distinguish intentionally produced
behaviour from mere accidents would improve the
fidelity of behavioural transmission. So it may be
that, in order to trigger blind over-imitation of details
of observed actions, the child has to appreciate that the
model’s action successfully achieves some result, or is
at least aimed at a goal. Revealingly, although children
will copy a goal that a human model attempts but fails
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to reach, they do not copy the goal when very similar
movements are performed by inanimate devices
(Meltzoff 1995, 1996; Tomasello & Carpenter 2005).
Children’s ability to distinguish intentionally produced
actions from both inanimate movements and mere acci-
dents (Carpenter et al. 1998) is compatible with both
the individual learning hypothesis and the inheritance
system hypothesis.
We remarked earlier on the cost–benefit trade-off
between the benefits of high-fidelity transmission
down the generations and costs in terms of lost oppor-
tunities for the individual to benefit from learning in
its own lifetime. Differences in ecology and selective
environment may form part of an explanation of why
humans have an imitation-based inheritance system
(if they do). We also noted that these costs and benefits
are different in different domains (e.g. learning to grow
crops versus learning to crack a nut). The suggestion
that humans deploy different social learning mechan-
isms to address different social problems (Gergely &
Csibra 2006) may turn out to reflect some of these
differences, although Gergely and Csibra themselves
explain these differences in terms of features of the
individual learning problem. This is quite different
from an explanation in terms of the costs of adopting
a relatively inflexible high-fidelity copying solution
where successful strategies are selected in a process
that takes place over many generations rather than in
individual ontogeny.
In short, the hypothesis that there is an imitation-
based inheritance system in humans (i.e. one with
the meta-function of transmitting behavioural pheno-
types down the generations), but not in other animals,
makes some otherwise puzzling differences between
the species neatly explicable. Although the evidence
so far is by no means all supportive, let alone conclus-
ive, the inheritance system hypothesis clearly merits
further investigation.
(b) Anti-outlaw conditions
If imitation is deployed in humans as an inheritance
system, then we should expect to find mechanisms
that operate to discourage horizontal or oblique trans-
mission of such behavioural traits (to non-relatives, to
the comparative disadvantage of the model). (Recall
that enhancing the fitness of non-relatives, by non-
vertical transmission, represents a cost in terms of
relative fitness.) One mechanism might simply be a
disposition to imitate more in childhood, while the
learner is still in the proximity of its parents (Schiel &
Huber 2006). Gergely & Csibra’s natural peda-
gogy is another obvious candidate to be a mechanism
encouraging verticality (Gergely & Csibra 2006;
Gergely et al. 2007; Tennie et al. 2009; although see
Vira´nyi & Range in press, suggesting that selective imi-
tation in pedagogical contexts may not be limited to
humans). If children tend only to imitate when a ped-
agogical context is signalled, that disposition may have
acted in recent evolutionary history to ensure copying
from parents predominates, limiting the extent to
which they copy behaviours horizontally or from unre-
lated individuals. Why would defectors not arise that
also imitate non-relatives? Perhaps because signalling
a pedagogical context is a piece of cooperative signalling.
It aids the learner in indicating which classes of actions
ought to be imitated, but the production of the signal is
under the control of the model. So the picture is of
models using cues such as eye contact, contingent reac-
tivity and the imitator’s own name to signal when actions
ought to be copied, and of their doing so more often to
kin than to others, at least in recent selective environ-
ments. This may be achieved by models selecting to
whom they signal a pedagogical context, perhaps com-
bined with population structures that ensure adult–
child interactions are largely between relatives.
Unlike the features discussed earlier that suggest a
high-fidelity copying mechanism, identifying natural
pedagogy as an anti-outlaw mechanism is much
more speculative. A line of evidence that counts
against this interpretation is the data on automatic imi-
tation effects.Thesewill be discussed further in the next
section when we ask about the library of perceptuo-
motor mappings that enable imitation to take
place at all. Here, it is the social role of automatic imi-
tation that creates trouble for the inheritance system
hypothesis. Research in social psychology has shown
the pervasive influence of various broadly imitative
effects on action, in a way that is not subject to con-
scious control (Bargh & Ezequiel 2008). These are
effects of a different kind than the goal-directed
imitation discussed earlier. They do not depend on
the imitator understanding the model’s actions to be
intentional or goal directed. Instead, features of
ongoing actions can be modified or primed by the
actions of a model (and by semantic cues, operating
unconsciously). Social psychologists suggest that
these forms of synchronous behaviour, far from
being mere epiphenomena, play an important social
role (van Baaren et al. 2009). Bastiaansen et al.
(2009) catalogue a variety of phenomena in which per-
ceptual, sensory and emotional mirroring occur
between people. Bastiaansen et al. argue that such
capacities have important social functions. Such
mirroring can lead to emotional affiliation in dyadic
interactions and can form the basis of defining social
groups. If that is right, then these kinds of broadly
imitative tendencies may have a different kind of
adaptationist explanation, one based on group selec-
tion (Boyd & Richerson 2005). This case is bolstered
by the finding that people do deploy a variety of
social learning strategies (Laland 2004), which are sus-
ceptible to group-selectionist explanation. As
remarked in §2b, the existence of a group-selectionist
explanation for imitative capacities, while not strictly
incompatible with the existence of an imitation-based
inheritance system based on vertical transmission,
would undercut some of the motivation for thinking
that a form of imitation has a meta-function based
on vertical transmission. The inheritance system
hypothesis might still be vindicated if a sharp separ-
ation can be made between automatic imitation effects
and copying of sequences of actions deployed in goal-
directed behaviour, but it is by no means clear that this
fine distinction corresponds to categories that can be
clearly distinguished empirically.
There may be other features of goal-directed imita-
tion that can be seen to be anti-outlaw mechanisms.
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Indeed, since little investigation to date has been
directly motivated by the inheritance system hypoth-
esis, it would not be surprising if there are further
phenomena associated with imitation still to be
discovered. Section 3d suggests some places to look
for anti-outlaw mechanisms.
(c) Transmission of novel variants
To imitate the action of another, an individual has to
have some way of going from a perceptual repre-
sentation of an observed action/outcome to a motor
representation of an action or sequence of actions
suited to achieving the same. This is the ‘correspon-
dence problem’. Mirror neurons are a candidate
mechanism for achieving this correspondence. Finding
appropriate mirror neurons in the brain shows that an
individual has managed to solve the correspondence
problem for some range of actions, but does not tell
us how: whether through a mechanism selected in
phylogeny and canalized in development, or through
individual learning. Although having some correspon-
dence mechanism is an essential prerequisite to the
kind of goal-directed imitation that is the subject of
the inheritance system hypothesis, it is by no means
all that is required. So we should distinguish between
correspondence mechanisms and low-level automatic
mirroring, on the one hand, and broadly goal-directed
emulation and imitation, on the other. Our focus here
is on relatively sophisticated capacities for learning
from observation, both in humans and in other
species, e.g. emulating the goal of an action sequence;
distinguishing actions from inanimate movements and
from accidents; imitating clearly inefficient steps
directed at a goal; etc. Such abilities presuppose that
the individual has a capacity that delivers correspon-
dences between what is perceived and how they can
act, but correspondence mechanisms should not be
equated with the kinds of imitation that are candidates
to form an inheritance system.
Rumiati et al. (2009) review the long history of
neuropsychological evidence that substantiates a
similar distinction between two kinds of neural mech-
anisms. One mechanism is the basis on which people
respond to perceptual stimuli by having an idea of a
corresponding movement (similar to the correspon-
dence mechanism discussed above). Impairment of
this mechanism leads to a reduced ability to imitate
gestures, called ideational apraxia. On the other
hand, there is a set of mechanisms involved in
execution or inhibition of such movements, impair-
ment of which is characterized as ideomotor apraxia.
Neuropsychological cases are consistent with the
evidence from social psychology discussed earlier,
suggesting that the default mode of operation of the
correspondence mechanism leads directly to auto-
matic mirroring actions. In normal cases, this is largely
inhibited. But deficits in inhibition, often caused by
lesions to the prefrontal cortex, reveal the operation
of the correspondence mechanism, manifesting in
patients with severe difficulties in controlling the ten-
dency to imitate in inappropriate ways.
The sublexical or direct route to action discussed by
Rumiati et al. reflects the library of perceptuo-motor
mappings for which the subject has a correspondence
mechanism. The fact that ideomotor apraxia is a
pathological condition reinforces the point about
goal-directed imitation being a complex capacity, of
which a correspondence mechanism is only one com-
ponent. Ferrari et al. (2009) report evidence that a
similar distinction between two different routes to
imitative behaviour is found in macaques. From the
perspective of cognitive neuroscience, Brass et al.
(2009) also find an important distinction between mir-
roring others’ actions and appreciating the goals,
intentions and other mental states of others. Although
goal-directed imitation may not require mentalizing in
any rich sense, it does show a sophisticated responsive-
ness to the goals and reasons of the imitated model, in a
way that goes far beyond mere mirroring. Interestingly,
Brass et al. argue that mentalizing actually arises from
systems that control low-level mirror systems, in order
to make a distinction between self and other that a
simple correspondence mechanism will fail to keep
track of. Both Rumiati et al. and Brass et al. echo aspects
of Susan Hurley’s shared circuits model, in which the
capacity for keeping track of the mental states of others
is argued to flow from the use of inhibition to distinguish
between self and other (Hurley 2008).
In short, there are several lines of evidence substan-
tiating the existence of two routes to broadly imitative
behaviour, one involving automatic mirroring, and the
other roughly at the intentional level. The correspon-
dence mechanism underlying automatic mirroring
provides the basis on which a goal-directed imitator
is able to perform the actions they observe. As such,
it furnishes a library of behavioural programs that are
possible candidates to be passed on by an imitation-
based inheritance system. Recall that the inheritance
system hypothesis suggests that there should be a
library of candidate behavioural programs that goes
wider than those that are currently passed on by imita-
tion—the library of variants that could be passed on by
vertical transmission and on which natural selection
could then act. So far, so good for the inheritance
system hypothesis. However, there is another strand
to the perspective offered by Rumiati et al. and by
Brass et al. which is unfavourable to the inheritance
system hypothesis. Both emphasize a role for high-
level intentional resources, like mentalizing, in the
operation of the indirect or semantic route to behav-
iour. If this kind of imitation always involves the imita-
tors thinking for themselves and reasoning out what to
do, then it is correspondingly less likely to be condu-
cive to the high-fidelity copying of behavioural pro-
grams down the generations. Ideomotor approaches
to imitation, as championed by Wolfgang Prinz
(Prinz 1990; Massen & Prinz 2009), also tend to
view imitation as a much more general rational
process, which would be rather unsuited to be a chan-
nel for high-fidelity copying of behavioural pheno-
types. As discussed in §3a, individual thought and
learning is likely to introduce too much noise into
the transmission process for any signature of selection
over the generations to persist. Evidence of blind
over-imitation points in the opposite direction, but it
is far from clear which is the more important tendency
in natural settings.
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A second putative feature of the mirror system does,
however, count much more clearly in favour of the
inheritance system hypothesis. It is standardly
assumed that the existence of an innate mirror
system would support there being a domain-specific
role for imitation-based learning. However, we saw in
§2c that the inheritance system hypothesis makes mat-
ters look quite different. If the imitable behaviours are
limited to those furnished by an innate mirror mechan-
ism, the power of an imitation-based mechanism to pass
on novel variants is significantly constrained. Recall
Maynard Smith & Szathmary’s (1995) emphasis on
the superior evolvability of unlimited systems of replica-
tion. The discovery that perceptuo-motor mappings
can be learned in individual experience (e.g. Prather
et al. 2008) therefore counts clearly, although rather
unintuitively, in favour of the inheritance system
hypothesis.
Ferrari et al. (2009) suggest that macaques are born
with a ‘prewired’ but wide library of imitative ten-
dencies. But they argue that, through the involvement
of mesial and prefrontal cortex, behavioural sequences
can be ‘parsed’ into elements that can be combined to
perform novel actions. Vogt et al. (2007) interpreted
corresponding activations found in an fMRI study as
reflecting subjects’ parsing of observed actions into a
goal and specific motor patterns. Recombination of
such elements would significantly increase the range
of behaviours available to be transmitted.
More radically, recent evidence suggests that even
classical mirror mechanisms are acquired through
individual experience. Neonatal imitation in humans
(Meltzoff & Moore 1977, 1983) and other species
(Ferrari 2009) are evidence that some correspondence
mechanisms already exist at birth, but the experiments
reported by Jones (2006, 2009) suggest that the
observed behaviours, in human neonates at least,
may not depend upon a correspondence mechanism
at all. Whether or not some correspondence mechan-
isms develop independently of experience, the results
reported by Catmur et al. (2007, 2009) strongly
suggest that existing correspondence mechanisms can
be added to, or adapted through, associative learning
from individual experience. Rizzolatti argues that
novel actions can be incorporated into the pre-existing
mirror system (Rizzolatti 2005; Huber et al. 2009),
whereas Catmur et al. argue that all correspondence
mechanisms are acquired by experience. Either way,
if it is right that the range of behaviours that can be
passed on by imitation is not limited to some innate
library of perceptuo-motor mappings, then the puta-
tive imitation-based inheritance system has greater
evolutionary power, and its capacity to explain the
exceptionalism of human culture is correspondingly
increased.
(d) New empirical questions
The inheritance system hypothesis produces its own
agenda about which are the most important avenues
for future research, which complements the research
questions made salient by taking other perspectives.
The hypothesis also generates some new questions of
its own.
Questions about the rationality and selectivity of
imitation are central to assessing the fidelity of imita-
tion as a putative imitation system. We observed that
primates, although capable of imitating an action in
a two-action test, are much more inclined to go for
goals, especially if they already have a technique for
reaching the goal. Correspondingly, how much are
children willing to override a known, individually
learnt action for achieving a goal when an alternative
means is demonstrated? It would also be good to
know more about the kinds of situations that trigger
imitative behaviour. Does it depend on inferring the
model’s intentions, or are goal-directed actions distin-
guished from accidents and non-actions by more
low-level features?
The suggestion that human imitation depends upon
a natural pedagogical context could be explored much
more. In particular, it would be useful to know how
much the kind of blind over-imitation that I have
argued could be the characteristic of high-fidelity
copying is selectively deployed in pedagogical contexts.
Does blind over-imitation depend upon triggering by
cues like eye gaze and use of the subject’s own
name? Furthermore, does this tendency depend upon
children seeing the model’s behaviour as normative—
as something they ought to do? If so, what is the
source of that normativity: the social authority of
the model, or just features of the learning situation?
Is there anything like this normative dimension in
any of the imitative behaviour of other species?
On the topic of the relative costs and benefits of
individual learning versus blind imitation, it is impor-
tant to know much more about whether imitative
tendencies are domain sensitive (e.g. food preferences,
tool use, social roles, etc.) and, if so, whether that
sensitivity marries up with the quality of the infor-
mation about the domain that would be available
through a channel of vertical inheritance.
A lot of research has been done on the level at which
different species imitate: goal, action, bodily move-
ment. If the capacity to imitate bodily movements is
more widespread than initially thought, then the ear-
lier suggestion about differences in motivation is
worth exploring. Perhaps chimpanzees are just much
more focused than humans on obtaining rewards. If
that is part of the explanation of the fact that primates
operate largely in the domain of emulation rather than
true imitation, then it should be possible to prompt
greater motor imitation by introducing contexts with
less competition pressure. The tantalizing video of
infant motor copying referred to in Marshall-Pescini &
Whiten (2008) is a plausible illustration of how
non-competitive contexts can draw out the capacity
to imitate motor programs.
Another set of questions concern the mirror system,
the putative library of behavioural programs available
to be copied down the generations. A basic question
that has been underexplored is to investigate how
tight the connection is between the perceptuo-motor
knowledge found in an individual’s mirror system
and the range of behaviours they are able to imitate.
It has been largely presumed that the one enables the
other, but it is not entirely clear that they even have
the same range of operation. Correlatively, is the
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range of behaviours that can be learnt by imitation
expanded or altered when an individual’s mirror
system is modified through associative learning (as in
Catmur et al. 2007)? Once we are thinking of the
mirror system as a (possibly extensible) library of
selectable variants, questions about cultural variation
in that library become pressing. How much do ten-
dencies for automatic imitation vary across human
cultures, and does that variation line up with the
different behaviours and skills that are passed on by
imitation in different societies?
In discussing features like high-fidelity copying that
could underpin an imitation-based inheritance system,
I have remained neutral about how those features
themselves are inherited. A ready thought is that
such features have arisen by genetic selection, but
that is not obligatory—they too could have arisen by
culture-based processes. Any process of extended ver-
tical transmission is a candidate. The possibility that
adaptations supporting social learning have themselves
arisen through culturally based selection has not, as far
as I am aware, yet received detailed empirical investi-
gation, by comparison with the large body of work
that investigates how particular behavioural adaptations
are culturally transmitted. The picture becomes more
complicated, but it does make it important to assess
the extent to which tendencies like blind over-imitation
and natural pedagogy are themselves the result of
cultural inheritance. The relevant questions there are
the usual ones: developmental canalization and cross-
cultural variation/universality. Relatedly, we can ask
just how much imitation has been a vertical transmission
process. In modern societies, with professional teachers
and a range of other media from which children learn, it
seems unlikely that vertical transmission dominates. But
the question remains of whether vertical transmission is
plausible in the recent evolutionary past. And if modern
societies differ in this respect, we should be able to find
the signs of imitation-based vertical inheritance losing
its individual-level adaptiveness as it is swamped by
horizontal transmission.
Finally, the inheritance system hypothesis suggests
other places where we could look for features that
encourage evolvability, by analogy with other forms of
inheritance. Are there any bottlenecks that act as anti-
outlaw mechanisms? (Natural pedagogy may have a
role here, too.) Is there any measure of developmental
modularity in the mechanisms of imitation, so that
learning a new behavioural sequence by imitation inter-
feres only minimally with existing behavioural pheno-
types? Are there any examples of biased transmission,
akin to segregation distorter genes, or the bias towards
feminizing their hosts displayed by some strains of
Wolbachia (Sterelny 2004)? Correspondingly, are there
mechanisms that operate to block biased transmission?
Sterelny (2004) observes that uniparental inheritance
of mitochondrial DNA acts as an anti-outlaw mechan-
ism. Gender-specific patterns of imitative behaviour
might have a corresponding effect at the level of
behavioural phenotypes, but gender differences in imita-
tion have not been explored with that in mind, to test
the inheritance system hypothesis.
Doubtless, most of these suggestions and analogies
will lead to false starts and dead ends; but at the very
least the inheritance system hypothesis generates some
ideas for discovering new phenomena associated with
imitation, going beyond the impressively detailed
hard-won knowledge that has already been gained on
the topic.
4. CONCLUSION
The theoretical perspective developed here underlines
the interest of the diverse lines of empirical enquiry
reported in this theme issue, disciplines that have
been brought together by the editors through their
EDICI project.5 The payoff shows the value of pursu-
ing such questions in the integrated interdisciplinary
fashion that the EDICI programme has been so
successful in promoting.
When recent empirical discoveries about the mech-
anisms and functions of imitation are brought
together, they can appear puzzling. They come into
sharper focus if viewed from the perspective of the
theoretical questions suggested here: is there an evolu-
tionarily powerful imitation-based inheritance mech-
anism? If so, is that a mechanism with the meta-
function of transmitting heritable behavioural pheno-
types down the generations—is it an inheritance
system? We have seen that the findings are as yet far
from conclusive. But if the answer to one or both of
these questions is yes, that would be part of a satisfying
explanation of why humans have more complex cumu-
lative cultures than those found in other animals,
including in species who share many of our social
learning mechanisms. It would thereby form one
part of an explanation of human exceptionalism. How-
ever, as this paper has argued, to have the evolutionary
power of an inheritance system, a mechanism must
meet a range of demanding requirements, much stron-
ger than the bare conditions that are enough to give rise
to some form of evolution by natural selection. The
explanatory payoff is substantial, but the hypothesis is
exacting.
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manuscript. Work on this paper was supported by the OUP
John Fell Research Fund, the James Martin 21st Century
School, the Oxford Centre for Neuroethics and the Mary
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ENDNOTES
1At the first-order level, evolution may select for a gene for some trait
T, whereas the meta-function arises by selection for the following
more general capacity: for all traits x, if selection selects for x,
ensure x is reliably transmitted to future generations.
2It can seem that the capacity to evolve complex adaptations is of
no benefit to individual organisms. But there is a fitness benefit for
individuals, once we shift our focus from the short-run fitness that is
necessarily deployed in mathematical models (offspring at the first or
second generation) and consider individual fitness in the very long
run. Take copying fidelity as an example. When a trait arises by
mutation that increases the fidelity by which selected traits are trans-
mitted down the generations, that is likely to increase the long-run fit-
ness of individuals bearing that trait. This is because, for each trait for
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which there is first-level selection, there will be more offspring in
individuals that also have the high-copying fidelity mechanism than
in individuals that do not, since the advantageous trait will be driven
out by copy errors in more of the individuals without the capacity for
high-fidelity copying (other things being equal). It follows from this
pattern that the capacity for high copying fidelity will have a selected
function, themeta-function reliably to transmit behavioural phenotypes.
3To strengthen that inference we need to rule out other explanations
for the features in question which, in the case of imitation, includes
the stories based on cultural group selection or trait-level memetic
selection mentioned above. Since the processes which help cultural
group selection get off the ground, like biases towards copying
based on conformity and success, are in tension with those that
are important for individual-level evolvability, the inference from
individual-level evolvability to the meta-function looks plausible.
But to make that case properly would require a more thorough
treatment of rival group-selectionist explanations than can be
pursued here.
4Thanks to Cecilia Heyes for pointing out this possibility.
5A project funded by the European Community’s Sixth Framework
Programme under contract number NEST 012929 to Ludwig
Huber, Cecilia Heyes, Marcel Brass and Gyorgy Gergely with the
title ‘Evolution, development and intentional control of imitation’;
for further information: www.univie.ac.at/edici.
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